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Arguably, the greatest barrier to the academic development and functioning of 
Ontario's twenty-two Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology (CAATs) is the 
hostile and suspicion laden relationship which exists between management and the 
union which represents the academic staff of the CAATs - the Ontario Public 
Service Employees Union (OPSEU). This was the conclusion of the commission 
on workload in the CAATs which I chaired in 1985 (IARC, 1985) and was 
corroborated in a study of CAAT governance by a Special Adviser to the Minister 
of Colleges and Universities the following year (Pitman, 1986). An indication of 
the degree of concern felt by the Ontario Government regarding management-
union relations in the CAATs is that the largest (in terms of time and resources) 
public commission on the CAATs to date has been the Colleges Collective 
Bargaining Commission (Gandz, 1988). 
Given the potential for good or harm arising from a labour relations process 
which impacts indirectly upon more than half a million CAAT students and clients 
in nearly every Ontario community of at least modest size, it is surprising how little 
published examination and analysis there has been of labour-management 
relations in the CAATs. No doubt, the paucity of writing about this facet of the 
CAATs is part of a larger phenomenon that is the scarcity of books and articles 
about the development of the CAATs. For example, Volume IV of W.G. 
Fleming's series, Ontario's Educative Society, published in 1971, just five years 
after the founding of the CAATs, is still the only book in print on the development 
of the CAATs; though the history of the CAATs is examined in some books on the 
development of community colleges in Canada, most notably Dennison and 
Gallagher's Canada's Community Colleges (1986). 
The purpose of this paper is to add to the public record regarding the 
development of the CAATs in general, and their labour-management relations in 
particular, by addressing the development of labour-management relations in the 
CAATs from the early years to the present. My objective is to provide not merely a 
descriptive treatment of the subject (though that in itself would be useful); but to 
attempt to present an interpretive analysis, employing the theoretical framework 
developed by the British Industrial Relations theorist, Alan Fox (1974). 
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The methodology is eclectic. I will draw upon the published sources available, 
as well as a variety of unpublished documents. In addition, I will make use of notes 
from the extensive interviews which I and my colleagues on the Instructional 
Assignment Review Committee (IARC) conducted with government officials, 
union representatives, faculty, and administrators in the course of our 1985 study 
and from subsequent visits to the CAATs. 
Given the intimate nature of my relationship to the subject matter of this 
undertaking, some prefatory comments of a personal nature are in order. I first got 
involved in the study of union-management relations in the CAATs shortly after a 
bitter three week academic staff strike was ended by controversial legislation. I 
was subjected to strident personal attacks for having accepted the IARC 
appointment by the Minister, and subsequent to the publication of the Committee's 
report I found myself the object of quite personal veneration in some quarters, 
scorn in other quarters. While the experience of being for a time at the centre of the 
developments about which I am writing gave me a degree of accessibility to the 
subject which is unusual for a university based researcher, it also provided for a 
potential ego involvement which requires considerable self-reflection and self-
discipline to keep in check. The problems involved in maintaining objectivity in 
social science research are well known, and I can add that I have studied these 
problems (and written on them - Skolnik, 1987) and have done my best to maintain 
scholarly objectivity in approaching this subject. 
The timing and structure of this paper demonstrate two of the strategies which I 
have employed to enhance objectivity. One has been to wait more than two years 
since the period of my intense involvement as a third party in CAAT 
labour-management relations before attempting to address the subject from a 
scholarly perspective. The other is to analyze the phenomena under study within 
the parameters of a well established conceptual framework. Indeed, discovering 
Alan Fox's model was very gratifying, because it seemed to me to illuminate 
labour-management relations in the CAATs better than any other set of theoretical 
constructs of which I know, and better than the largely atheoretical approach 
which, under tight time constraints, the IARC employed in its report. 
I. FOX'S CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE 
RELATIONS 
Trust Relations and Trust Dynamics 
The dominant conclusion of the IARC study was that the academic and working 
environment in the CAATs was characterized by an extraordinarily low level of 
trust between faculty and management, and this low level of trust permeated every 
aspect of college operations which required cooperation, interaction, or simply 
communication between management and faculty. In reporting our findings, we 
employed the concept of trust as an ad hoc concept. I was not aware at the time of 
the extensive literature, for example in group dynamics, in which the concept of 
trust is developed formally and serves as the basis of theoretical models of human 
relationships. 
The Evolution of Relations Between Management and Faculty in 
85 Ontario Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology 
Following Deutsch (1962), Zand (1972: 230) defined trusting behaviour as 
consisting of actions "that (a) increase one's vulnerability, (b) to another whose 
behaviour is not under one's control, (c) in a situation in which the penalty 
(disutility) one suffers if the other abuses that vulnerability is greater than the 
benefit (utility) one gains if the other does not abuse that vulnerability". 
Applying this concept to the employment setting, Fox characterizes a high trust 
relationship as one in which the parties (i) have a shared view of organizational 
ends and appropriate means to achieve those ends; (ii) bear a diffuse sense of long 
term obligations toward one another; (iii) offer one another spontaneous support 
without narrowly calculating the benefits and costs of each interaction or expecting 
exact reciprocity in the short run; (iv) give each other the benefit of the doubt in the 
face of uncertainty of outcomes or incomplete information; and (v) communicate 
freely and openly with one another. In contrast, in a low trust relationship, parties 
have divergent views about organizational ends and means; calculate the costs of 
each concession to the other and demand equivalent benefits in the short term; 
ensure that the obligations of each to the other are carefully spelled out in 
prescriptive rules with explicit penalties for non-compliance; are constantly 
vigilant toward the other's behaviour and quick to invoke sanctions when the rules 
are even minimally transgressed; and communicate with one another in a carefully 
guarded and instrumental manner. A major characteristic of a low trust 
relationship is that each party attempts to restrict the scope for discretionary 
action of the other. 
The nature of the trust relations between parties may change as a result of actions 
taken by either party, giving rise to trust dynamics. For example, management 
might introduce new procedures which reduce employee discretion and foster a 
perception that it no longer bears the same degree of trust toward employees that it 
once did. Employees might react with more frequent questioning of management 
judgment or more formal grievances in situations that used to be resolved 
informally. Faced with such behaviour, management will likely intensify 
supervision and discipline and communicate more formally with employees, 
provoking further low trust reactions by employees and accelerating a vicious 
cycle of low trust move and counter-move. In this example, the initial 
management actions disrupted an equilibrium and created an imbalance in 
reciprocity, which, when redressed by the other side, created a negative trust 
dynamic. 
Trust dynamics may be negative or positive, initiated by either party. Generally, 
because of its greater control over the work setting, management has greater 
capability to initiate a trust dynamic than do employees or unions. A union can, 
however, initiate a negative trust dynamic by a sudden flood of grievances, a 
spontaneous intensification of militancy in bargaining, or a new insistence on 
formality where previously there had been a tradition of informal interaction with 
management. 
An important consideration for either party in determining whether to initiate a 
positive trust dynamic is the likelihood that the high trust behaviour will be 
reciprocated. For management to give workers greater discretion or influence in 
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determining work processes and outcomes, it must be reasonably confident that 
workers will use the increased discretion and influence in ways that it perceives to 
be in the interests of the organization. A high trust initiative also requires patience, 
for a party that has felt itself to be abused for a long time may need a sustained high 
trust initiative by the other side in order to overcome its suspicion regarding the 
genuineness of the other's intentions. It is not uncommon for employers whose 
initial overtures are not immediately reciprocated to pull back, saying, "I told you 
so, we can't really trust the union". 
Unions too must be wary, especially when dealing with a management which in 
the past has shown little tendency to bend rules or give the benefit of the doubt. 
There is understandable fear that hard won gains may be lost rapidly through the 
adoption of a more cooperative stance or reciprocation of overtures which, based 
upon an experience of strained relations, might be perceived as manipulative. 
Organizational Compact and Frames of Reference 
Fox suggests two alternative sets of ideological underpinning of relationships 
between management and employees, which I will refer to as models of 
organizational compact. These are the spontaneous consensus model (SCM) and 
the power model (PM). 
In the SCM, people are joined together in an organization in a sense of 
agreement on organizational goals and the means that are perceived as appropriate 
for achieving them. Consequently, parties accept the division of labour, authority, 
and discretion vested in different organizational roles as both legitimate and useful 
for achieving common goals. Usually, if not always, an SCM organization must 
transcend purely economic goals, for economic ends by themselves provide 
insufficient symbolic gratification to galvanize social consensus, and as well, 
economic motivation is inherently divisive. Typically, the SCM requires the 
articulation of a vision which caters to broad human needs and aspirations and 
provides a sense of purpose and meaning for those who subscribe to it. An SCM 
organization, with its agreement about ends and means, is characterized by high 
trust and a stable equilibrium of reciprocity so long as the vision continues to be 
meaningful to all parties. 
In the power model, complementary needs take the place of agreement on ends 
and means. The complementary needs are usually of an economic nature: the 
employer needs workers to produce the product or service that is to be sold for 
profit; the workers need the remuneration for their services. As well, other needs 
may be involved, but usually for commodities which are in limited supply, i.e. 
prestige, recognition, power, etc. 
Because it is a marriage of necessity, with the parties having divergent goals, the 
PM is generally characterized by low trust. Its stability derives from a balance of 
power, as an accommodation is reached at a point where for each party the 
anticipated costs of seeking further advantage (or less disadvantage) would 
outweigh the anticipated benefits of such actions. Such stability is fragile, since 
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internal or external environmental changes (e.g. in product or labour markets or in 
the political climate) which might lead the parties to perceive a change in their 
relative power could engender attempts to upset the status quo. 
The feature which distinguishes these two models is the existence of agreement, 
or divergence, with respect to organizational goals and means to achieve them. 
The existence of such agreement is largely a matter of perception. To address this 
matter of perception, Fox introduces the concept of frames of reference. Frames of 
reference are perspectives through which people perceive and define social and 
organizational realities, and these perceptions and definitions shape their be-
haviour. 
Fox distinguishes between unitary and pluralist frames of reference. One who 
holds a unitary frame of reference perceives the underlying situation to be one of a 
shared vision of organizational objectives. It is not that all is sweetness and light, 
but that the underlying reality is perceived as communal and observed differences 
are treated as superficial or ephemeral, like family quarrels. In the pluralist frame 
of reference, it is perceived that there is a fundamental divergence of interests 
among the parties in the organization, no mater how cooperatively or congenially 
they may work together at certain times or in certain endeavors. As the core reality 
is defined as consisting of conflicting interests and claims, conflict is deemed to be 
inevitable, if not desirable. As such, mechanisms and processes for reconciling the 
inevitable conflicts are deemed to be a vital component of the organizational 
infrastructure. 
Patterns of Management-Employee Relations 
The final element of Fox's conceptual framework is his typology of patterns of 
management-employee relationships, defined in terms of various combinations of 
the alternative frames of reference held by the parties. The Traditional pattern is 
characterized by both management and employees having a unitary frame of 
reference, perceiving themselves as having common goals, as might be the case of 
company towns. Management may be benevolent or despotic toward workers, 
much like masters toward servants. 
Classical Conflict obtains where management holds a unitary frame of reference 
and employees define the situation as pluralist, and hence seek a voice in the affairs 
of the organization in order to defend or advance their own interests. Should 
workers organize, management would see unionization as a low trust initiative 
which threatens to introduce conflict into a situation where there was an underlying 
harmony. Management denies the legitimacy of the union, and management's use 
of family and team metaphors is seen by the union as obfuscation, manipulation, 
and an attempt to undermine the union. 
More sophisticated employers may come to feel that there are benefits in having 
a union - formal mechanisms for order, predictability, discipline, etc. - and that 
anyway they have no choice but to live with it. Management's acceptance of 
legitimacy of the union leads to the Sophisticated Modern pattern, in which both 
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parties hold a pluralist frame of reference. This pattern is characterized by a high 
degree of formality (i.e. each party tries to "spin a web of rules around the other") 
and alternating bouts of intense conflict and wary truce. 
The three patterns described above all assume monolithicity on both the 
management and employee sides, an assumption which is perhaps not realistic in 
large scale enterprises which have complex structures, varied recruiting patterns, 
and non-systematic socialization practices, especially in the public sector. 
Ambivalence and difference of opinion on one or both sides of the relationship 
defines the Standard Modern pattern. Management may be divided between those 
(including some who have come through the ranks) who see the union as an 
appropriate agent of legitimately different interests and those who view it as an 
inherent source of disharmony in an otherwise communal setting. The struggle 
among management hawks and doves may present a divided face to the union and 
introduce oscillations into the relationship, with those who favour a tougher stance 
frequently gaining the upper hand in times of crisis. 
Similarly, the union membership may be divided, with some identifying with 
"the company" and its goals, others emphasizing the inherently conflictual nature 
of the relationship ("You have to remember that they're different from us"). 
Achievement motivated professional workers in particular may prefer to have their 
individual efforts recognized by management and resent having their communica-
tions channeled through the union. 
An important source of difference of opinion among union members may be 
between those espousing different variants of the pluralist frame of reference, 
particularist and universalist. The former focuses upon matters particular to his or 
her organization: its functional objectives, work procedures, terms and conditions 
of employment. The universalist tends to view union activity primarily as a means 
to change the existing social order, or at least to redress wrongs in society that 
extend beyond the walls of the organization. In attempting to build a coalition to 
achieve a given end, the universalist may find it useful to couch his or her demands 
in the language of particularism. 
Sensing the division on the other side, each side may opt for a divide-and-
conquer strategy, or may develop its own strategy based upon misperceptions of 
the relative strength of the different factions on the other side, thus making the 
standard modern pattern a recipe for chaotic and unpredictable labour relations. 
A fifth pattern occurs when a sophisticated management perceives benefits from 
encouraging the formation of a "suitable union" among an older, passive, or inert 
workforce. In situations where some workers are unionized and some aren't, 
management may prefer the remaining unassertive group also to unionize so as to 
facilitate greater consistency in handling labour relations and to legitimize 
equitable treatment of all groups. Where management, with a pluralist frame of 
reference, tries to bring along employees who have a unitary frame of reference, 
the pattern is defined as Sophisticated Paternalist. 
The final pattern which Fox identifies, Continuous Challenge, is the other side 
of classical conflict. Whereas in the latter,the union tries to conduct a relationship 
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with a management which denies its legitimacy, in continuous challenge the shoe 
is on the other foot. Management accepts the legitimacy of the union, from 
necessity or conviction, but the union challenges every exercise of management 
prerogative. 
These six prototypes are presented as heuristic simplifications of the dominant 
characteristics of management-employee relations which might stand out at a 
particular time. As with most typologies of this kind, the phenomena which they 
describe elude precise measurement. Further, Fox suggests that the patterns of 
relationships change from time to time, and not necessarily in a predictable manner 
or developmental sequence. The benefit of this typology, and the related concepts 
of trust dynamics, organizational compact, and frames of reference, is that it 
enables one to summarize economically the salient characteristics of the dynamics 
of relationships between management and employees. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE 
RELATIONS IN THE CAATS: THE EARLY YEARS 
The Social Consensus 
The passage of time has perhaps dulled our collective sense of the sheer magnitude 
of innovation which the establishment of the CAATs represented. The then Leader 
of one of the opposition parties in the Ontario Legislature, Donald MacDonald, 
retrospectively described the creation of the CAAT system as "the most important 
development in our [Ontario's] over-all education system that has taken place, 
perhaps, in the past century" (quoted in Hamblin, 1984: 1). Dennison and 
Gallagher refer to the establishment of new community college systems across 
Canada in the 1960's as "ushering in a completely new era of postsecondary 
education" (p. 17) and of the early vision of the colleges as "a major force for new 
and improved concepts of citizenship in Canada" and an important vehicle for 
nation-building (p. 275). 
Consistent with the social idealism of the 1960's, the establishment of the 
CAATs embodied one of the necessary conditions for the social consensus model, 
a vision: 
In every new venture there must be a vision of the future, a vision which 
enables the pioneer to project his thoughts and ideals beyond the arduous first 
steps. Where goals are clear and high, progress is sure and sound (Ontario, 
1965: 1). 
The above quotation from the Basic Documents for the CAAT system suggests 
an almost evangelical spirit, with its reference to ideals and pioneer, and an almost 
unlimited faith in rationality and progress. The more detailed statements about the 
goals of the CAATs in that and other documents invoke all of the lofty values about 
which there was such passion at the time: equality, unlimited development of 
human potential, progressiveness, and redress of social and economic disadvan-
tage. These were the sorts of organizational goals about which it would have been 
possible to forge a social consensus. 
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Further, the process which led to the establishment of the CAATs was a lengthy 
and open one in which there was opportunity for the views of all interested parties 
to be widely presented and debated in numerous advisory and planning commit-
tees, newspapers, and television (Watson, 1971: 50). In the event, there appeared 
to be a strong consensus on the establishment of the CAAT system, except with 
respect to the single issue of whether the colleges would provide university transfer 
courses (Fleming, p. 514). Even there, the minority position in favour of transfer 
was confined mainly to some educators from the universities and to a few 
opposition members in the Legislature who, Fleming suggests, could find nothing 
else in the Government's proposals to criticize. While those who have remarked 
upon the strength of social consensus which undergirded the establishment of the 
CAATs tended to focus mainly upon the observed sentiments of the most visible 
parties - members of the Legislature, education associations, and community and 
business leaders - there is no reason to doubt that these sentiments were not shared 
also by the newly appointed faculty and administrators of the CAATs, who, after 
all, were drawn from the very same constituencies. My own observations from 
having visited the CAATs in the late 1960's and the recollection of all faculty 
whom I have interviewed on this subject evoke nostalgic reminiscences of the 
collective euphoria derived from participating in one of the greatest social and 
educational movements in Ontario's history. 
Promoting a Unitary Frame of Reference 
As one might expect in the context of such a strong social consensus, those who 
designed the CAAT system clearly evidenced a unitary frame of reference. One of 
the longest sections of the Basic Documents was that headed, "College Commit-
tee", which began: 
The faculty and student population of a College of Applied Arts and 
Technology will be more diverse than that of other educational institutions. 
This fact suggests some problems, but it should be possible to develop a 
strong sense of unity with the col lege, thus preventing the rather rigid class 
system that often prevails in other educational institutions [emphasis added]. 
The section made substantial reference to various other administration-faculty-
student committees besides the College Committee, and the importance of 
collegial interaction was underscored by the suggestion that provision for the 
committees be made in the timetable: "a complete shutdown of academic 
procedures for a two-hour period weekly is suggested". 
That the Government was, with at least some of its more visible public 
statements like those quoted above, exhorting staff to be members of a team, i. e. to 
adopt a unitary frame of reference, there is little doubt. There is doubt, however, as 
to whether some of the Government's other actions were consistent with this 
rhetoric, and as to whether faculty bought into the unitary model. The statements 
about College Committee, for example, were unaccompanied by any concrete 
provisions for meaningful faculty participation in academic policymaking. This 
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omission was of particular concern to James Renwick, a New Democratic Party 
member of the Legislature, who claimed that the Minister "had a responsibility to 
provide, in an imaginative way, within the colleges, a method by which members 
of the colleges could play a meaningful role in the government of their institutions" 
(Smyth, 1970: 213). For Renwick, faculty participation, institutional autonomy, 
an independent Council of Regents, and a commitment to genuine education and 
not just training, were all interrelated, and he feared that the CAATs would 
become simply a network of training institutes heavily "dominated by the Minister 
and his Department". With prescience that borders on grim irony, he warned more 
than twenty years ago that "the Minister's insistence on excluding the academic 
community from participation in the governance of the colleges was going to be a 
matter which would result in difficulties until such exclusion had been rectified" 
(p. 214). Supporting Renwick's position, Stephen Lewis argued that the exclusion 
of faculty from decision making was "antagonistic to the kind of intellectual 
creativity ... which should be characteristic of the new institutions", and Donald 
MacDonald alleged that the Government had "set up a 19th Century structure for 
the colleges" (pp. 215-216). 
As the documentation on the establishment and early years of the CAATs 
concentrates upon the statements of the key opinion leaders in the Province, it is 
not known how widely, if at all, the concerns noted above were shared by faculty 
in the CAATs. Indeed, while Renwick and company were challenging the Minister 
in the Legislature, the CAAT faculty were sinking into an imbroglio of confusion 
over representation, and it is not clear just who the effective spokespersons for the 
faculty were. Such statements from CAAT faculty as were reported in provincial 
newspapers concentrated upon bargaining rights and salaries. This together with 
the fact that faculty participation in college decision making did not become a 
major public issue until the 1980's suggests that there was not widespread 
discontent among faculty with the vision of the CAATs enunciated by the 
Minister. Or it may have been that faculty were too enamoured of their new roles 
and too excitedly busy with discharging their new responsibilities to critically 
evaluate the larger designs which emanated from Queen's Park. Probably a 
definitive judgment on the matter is impossible, but it is likely that novelty and 
abundant money papered over the latent cracks of divisiveness, resulting, for a 
time, in a fragile unitary frame of reference among the majority of faculty. 
The Development of Collective Bargaining Relationships 
The development of collective bargaining in the CAATs has yet to come under the 
historian's glass, but some documentation is provided by Fleming (pp. 551-555) 
and Smyth (pp. 384-391), as well as newspaper archives. As many staff of the 
former Trades and Technology Institutes which were incorporated into the new 
colleges had been members of the Civil Service Association of Ontario (CSAO, 
which later evolved into OPSEU) or of federations with bargaining rights, it was 
assumed that CAAT staff would become organized in some fashion. Fleming 
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reports that Boards of Governors of some colleges were seeking the authority to do 
their own bargaining, but that the Government's desire for Provincial control over 
the colleges precluded any chance that this right would be conceded to the boards 
(p. 528). As developments unfolded, faculty were eventually given two options 
from which to choose, but never did they have the choice of voting for local 
bargaining. 
Following a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board which threw out a 
certification application from the faculty of Fanshawe College on the grounds that 
Fanshawe was a Crown Agency and hence the OLRB had no jurisdiction, the 
CSAO approached the Council of Regents and claimed that it was entitled to 
exclusive bargaining rights for CAAT staff under The Public Service Act. The 
Negotiating Committee of the Council of Regents responded by recognizing the 
CSAO as bargaining agent, without consultation with colleges or their faculty 
(Little, 1969: 23). It is not entirely clear whether the negotiating committee took 
this action because (a) it thought that it was required to so under The Public Service 
Act; (b) it seemed the most expeditious course of action; or (c) this was the 
bargaining arrangement preferred by the Government. Interviews with faculty 
reported by the press suggest a perception that (c) was the correct answer, as the 
Government was used to dealing with CSAO and was comfortable with its 
concentration upon pecuniary, as opposed to educational, issues (The Globe and 
Mail, February 2, 1970; Zwelling, 1971). Insofar as this perception was accurate, 
the earliest pattern of management-employee relations in the CAAT system had 
elements of Sophisticated Paternalist. However, even in this early period the 
management side was hardly unified, as a majority of CAAT Boards of Governors 
passed a resolution in December, 1968, calling upon the Council of Regents to 
cease bargaining on behalf of the Boards. 
Be that as it may, the next significant event was in January, 1969, when a group 
of faculty, on behalf of the Ontario Federation of Community College Faculty 
Associations, obtained a court injunction preventing the CSAO from exercising 
bargaining rights for the faculty. Subsequently, Judge Walter Little, who had been 
appointed Special Adviser to the Ontario Government concerning collective 
bargaining in the Public Service and Crown Agencies and Commissions, noted 
that the CSAO did not have a "significant" number of members of the academic 
staff to constitute a basis for representation and its right to represent faculty had 
been challenged by another group. In this situtation, Judge Little declined to make 
any recommendation as to what agent should represent the academic staff. Shortly 
thereafter, the Government announced its intention to introduce legislation which 
would establish procedures for employees of the CAATs "within appropriate 
bargaining units" to select their bargaining agent (Davis, 1970). Many CAAT 
faculty remained skeptical of the Government's intentions, fearing that the 
Government would somehow manipulate them into the CSAO. The Federation of 
College Faculty Associations pressured for consultation on the legislation and 
organized a one day walk-out to emphasize its concerns. A vote was finally held in 
January, 1971, and by a narrow margin the CSAO was selected over the 
Federation to be the bargaining agent in Province-wide negotiations. It is 
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noteworthy, however, that in large part, the events which led to the determination 
of the faculty bargaining unit were heavily dominated by political machinations 
external to the colleges, and that the normal processes for forming bargaining units 
were never experienced directly by most faculty and college managers. Insofar as 
the experience of management and employees going together through the various 
stages that are typical in the establishment of a bargaining relationship facilitates 
the development of a healthy relationship, it might be observed that this 
relationship started off on the wrong footing by omitting those stages. 
In recognition of the strong divisions of opinion on the faculty side, the 
Government had, through allowing, if not encouraging, a representation vote, 
moved the bargaining pattern from the Sophisticated Paternalist a good ways to-
ward the Standard Modern. Still, as long as the CSAO was something short of a 
full-fledged union and the faculty were denied the right to strike, taints of 
paternalism lingered on. The last vestiges of the paternalistic phase ended in 1974 
when CAAT faculty became the first members of CSAO to defy the compulsory 
arbitration provisions of the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act and 
boycott the arbitration hearings which the legislation provided as the final dispute 
resolution mechanism, prompting the Chairman of the Council of Regents to 
charge that the CSAO was using the CAAT faculty bargaining unit to gain the right 
to strike for the public service (The Toronto Star, September 16, 1974). 
Whatever the validity of this charge, it reflected a concern held by many - and 
for different reasons - about the appropriateness of incorporating education 
professionals within a large public service union most of whose members were less 
educated, less well paid, and had different employment interests than the CAAT 
faculty. In particular, a great many of the early faculty of the CAATs were 
recruited from the lower and middle ranks of industry, as well as owners and 
managers of small companies, and many of these were uncomfortable with the 
idea of participating in a union. On a more general plane, Dennison and Gallagher 
argue that the public service model of college unionism "falls short in not 
recognizing the distinctiveness of the college as a workplace" and in "not 
acknowledging the professional character of college instruction and the profes-
sional training of those who provide it" (p. 225). A more pointed concern is that the 
interests of the colleges, as they are represented through the formal labour relations 
process, might take a back seat to the larger interests of the public service union. 
Such concerns have led disaffected faculty on more than one occasion, since the 
1969 court injunction, to attempt to have the CAAT faculty unit removed from 
OPSEU. For example, in 1977, teachers from at least seven colleges tried to 
promote a withdrawal of the faculty from OPSEU, charging that their membership 
in the public service union frustrated attempts of teachers to address educational 
issues and gain participation in college decision making comparable to that which 
university professors had. The President of OPSEU downplayed such concerns, 
noting that as the union represented "many interests, with at least 1,600 
classifications, it would be easy to take many groups and single them out as being 
unique" (The London Free Press, April 18, 1977; see also The Ottawa Citizen, 
same date). The differences of opinion among faculty with respect to the 
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appropriateness of the public sector model to their educational and professional 
interests is but one of many indications of the heterogeneity of their perceptions of 
workplace issues (others of which will be indicated in the next section), illustrating 
the ambivalence and division on the faculty side characteristic of the Standard 
Modern pattern of management-employee relationships. 
By the mid-Seventies, such ambivalence and division had become apparent also 
on the management side, where a perennial problem has been simply to determine 
who the "employer" is. A faculty member's employment contract is with the 
Board of Governors of his or her college; the Council of Regents is the bargaining 
agent and signs the collective agreement on behalf of management; the college 
administration administers the collective agreement and handles grievances; the 
Government, through the Ministry of Colleges and Universities, provides the staff 
for negotiations and is alleged by many to be calling the shots behind the scenes, 
especially on items having financial implications; and interposed among these 
agents are the Committee of Presidents and various other advisory committees 
drawn from college administration. Within and among these bodies there have 
been considerable differences of opinion as to the legitimacy of the union, whether 
to take an aggressive or conciliatory stance, and on goals and strategies with 
respect to major items in negotiation. Further, each of these agents has different 
access points for obtaining information on faculty and union attitudes and 
concerns, giving rise to different anticipations about the likely response of faculty 
to different management positions. Additionally, the day-to-day interactions 
between administration and faculty which do so much to colour the parties' 
perceptions and shape their demands occur in twenty-two diverse and dispersed 
colleges which vary widely with regard to the involvement and respect as pro-
fessionals accorded faculty, management style, union militancy, and the quality 
of management-faculty relationships. 
And yet, with all the potential for division that was inherent in the large, 
complex organizational structure, it appeared that there was a surprising degree of 
consensus in the system until the mid-Seventies, regarding the organizational 
goals of the CAATs and the means to achieve them. Union concerns tended to be 
concentrated upon the structure and process of bargaining - first, on the choice of 
bargaining agent, then on obtaining the right to strike - and on salaries. Few 
faculty challenged the vision of the system enunciated by the Government. Nor is 
there evidence that management felt faculty morale, commitment, or conflict to be 
one of the major issues in the CAATs. 
III. FROM 1977 TO THE PRESENT: LOW TRUST DYNAMICS AND 
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SOCIAL CONSENSUS 
Funding Cutbacks and the Breakdown of the Consensus 
The CAAT system was intended to consolidate nearly all publicly provided 
non-degree postsecondary and adult education and training in the Province, offer a 
quality alternative to university for all school leavers, address the needs of 
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business and industry relative to the "technological revolution" and "knowledge 
explosion", and provide staff and facilities that would be on the cutting edge of 
technology, practice, and pedagogy. It was understood that this undertaking 
would be expensive, and the Government made a commitment to providing the 
required funds: 
The proposed establishment of a network of colleges is an immense 
undertaking which will necessarily consume very large sums of money. 
[William Davis, Minister of Education, in his remarks to the inaugural 
meeting of the Council of Regents, 1966] 
By the mid-Seventies, however, just as the largest cohorts of students were 
preparing to enter Ontario's colleges and universities, the Government claimed 
that there was a financial crisis and began to cut back on spending for 
postsecondary education. Whether these cutbacks were genuinely necessitated by 
fiscal conditions or reflected simply a change in the Government's spending 
priorities has yet to be established (see Skolnik and Rowen, 1984: 13-18, 
124-133; Skolnik and Slaughter, 1987: 129-131), but the perception widely held 
among university and college faculty was that the latter was the case and that 
postsecondary education was bearing the brunt of an attack on the public sector 
that was driven by ideology not by revenue. And the cuts were substantial. 
Between 1978/79 and 1983/84, provincial operating grants per student in the 
CAATs declined in real dollars by one-third, while enrolment increased by fifty 
per cent (IARC: 32-33). The Council of Ontario Universities and the Ontario 
Council on University Affairs estimated in 1983 that as a result of cutbacks, the 
university system was "underfunded" to the tune of 300 to 500 million dollars, or 
20 to 35 per cent of total system revenue (Skolnik and Rowen, p. 138). While no 
agency produced analogous estimates for the CAATs, the funding recommenda-
tions in the IARC Report suggested an underfunding of 60 to 80 million dollars, or 
about 16 per cent of Government operating grants.1 
The funding cutbacks contributed to a negative trust dynamic in several 
ways. First, the substantial reductions in funding were perceived by faculty as 
an indication that the Government was no longer as committed to its vision for 
the CAAT system as it once had been. Faculty in both the colleges and the 
universities took the cuts as a sign that the Government no longer valued so highly 
the work which they did, i.e. as a slap in the face. Further, faculty took as 
offensive, Government statements that the funding reductions would not impair 
quality, as they felt that there was a quite strong relationship between quality and 
real revenue per student. To faculty, those statements implied that the Government 
perceived there to be substantial fat, waste, or inefficiency in postsecondary 
education, a charge always certain to evoke anger from educators. 
That this was indeed the Government's perception was suggested by the passion 
with which the Ministry and Council of Regents undertook to study the efficiency 
of the CAAT system (described in the IARC, pp. 73-74). Now those who manage 
educational systems must, of necessity, be concerned with efficiency, but they 
must balance this concern with at least equal attention to the quality of learning and 
other outcomes. Where this balance is lacking, teachers and students may rightly 
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fear that their organizations are preoccupied with such things as numbers and 
money, to the debasement of intrinsically educational matters. This unfortunate 
state of affairs is exactly what the faculty perceived in the early 1980's, as the 
visible interest in efficiency was unmatched by any comparable studies of the 
quality of education in the CAATs - and, to boot, the discontinuance of external 
assessment of technology programs (IARC, p. 83). 
As a result of the increased emphasis on efficiency, faculty picked up on the 
metaphors, first introduced by NDP members of the Legislature in the mid-Sixties, 
of the colleges as factories, and possibly 19th Century ones at that. This is a charge 
that has been made about various educational institutions from time to time, and 
has been developed analytically by Alexander Astin of the UCLA Institute for 
Higher Education Research. Astin distinguishes between the industrial production 
model and the humanistic model of postsecondary education institutions (1985: 
14-17). In the industrial production model, the purpose of education is to 
maximize efficiency in the service of a jurisdiction's economic needs; in the latter 
it is to maximize the total human potential of students and staff. 
These models imply quite different management styles. An institution which 
views itself as producing commodities for the market (i.e. skilled graduates for 
employers) will likely adopt a management style that is congruent with its 
production orientation, in Veblen's words, "principles and standards of organiza-
tion, control, and achievement that have been accepted as an habitual matter of 
course in the conduct of business, will, by force of habit, in good part reassert 
themselves as indispensable and conclusive in the affairs of learning" (quoted in 
Astin, p. 15). In contrast, an organization which is committed to the total 
development of its students and staff is less likely to operate in a hierarchical mode 
and will not view students as raw material to be processed. It will be as concerned 
with organizational processes as with outcomes, appreciate the importance of 
developing its faculty, and heed Dennison and Gallagher's observation that "it 
would be an imprudent college that ignored the contributions that professional 
experts [the teachers] can make to college policy formulation, to priority setting, 
and to management and administration" (p. 207). 
The CAAT model, as enunciated in the Basic Documents, has elements of both 
the industrial production and the humanistic models, and no doubt this ambiguity 
helped to produce the initial consensus. However, the ambiguity also created a 
situation wherein a slight shift in emphasis in either direction could cause some 
who were a party to that consensus to claim that the rules had been broken and that 
those who managed the system had broken with the faith. So long as there were 
abundant funds, there could be sufficient initiatives to placate both camps and the 
strains of pulling in two quite different directions could be tolerated. If the 
dominant management style was one of hierarchy and "collegiality when 
convenient but not necessarily collegiality", many faculty could nonetheless enjoy 
considerable autonomy through delegated roles in developing new programs, 
curricula, facilities, and sub-structures. When money became scarcer and 
efficiency a preoccupation, the fragile consensus upon which the CAATs began 
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operations was in danger. Yet, notwithstanding the crucial role in this process of 
the breakdown of consensus that was played by money, it is important to note that 
the faculty revolt of the 1980's was not simply a revolt over funding; it was more a 
case that the financial stringency of the late Seventies and Eighties brought into 
greater visibility the inconsistencies in the CAAT value structure which earlier had 
been papered over by money. 
Two other observations about the period of financial stringency are in order. 
First, though real operating funding per student declined substantially, capital 
funding was hit even harder. The horror stories of equipment shortage and 
obsolescence (except in some trendy programs) which are related in the IARC 
Report suggested that the element of the original vision which was for the CAATs 
to be on the cutting edge of technology was being compromised, and a very visible 
compromise it was. Second, there was a feeling among faculty that their time was 
being subjected to greater monitoring and control, and that written correspondence 
from management increasingly was replacing informal communication, in part no 
doubt a result of the increased size and complexity of the colleges. With a great 
enrolment expansion simultaneous with funding cutbacks in a labour intensive 
operation, faculty time had become the scarce factor, and management was under 
great pressure to use it most efficiently. An efficiency study done by the Ministry 
showed that of the 19.9 per cent reduction in operating cost per student between 
1978/79 and 1982/83, the vast bulk, 17.3 per cent, was from a reduction in unit 
teaching cost (Ontario, 1984). The major factors responsible for the reduction in 
teaching costs were increases in section size, reduction in the hours that students 
spent in class, and increases in contact hours for faculty. While the collective 
agreement provided for contact hours of faculty to vary at the discretion of 
management in relation to differences in class size, nature of subject matter, 
instructor's familiarity with the curriculum, and other factors, the IARC found that 
the vast majority of faculty were assigned nearly the maximum number of hours 
allowed for their category in the agreement. The Committee concluded that 
managing a CAAT was seen by many as consisting largely of devising ways of 
getting the maximum teaching hours, or student contact hours, out of faculty. 
The combined effect of all the tendencies outlined in this section was to shatter 
the consensus that had existed earlier regarding the goals of the CAATs. But at the 
same time, the emphases on efficiency, the greater control of faculty time, and the 
increased formality in communication were all perceived by faculty as low trust 
initiatives. As Fox's trust model suggests, these low trust moves of management 
were met with counter moves in a low trust direction by faculty. Before 
considering the faculty reaction, it is necessary to examine the way in which the 
pluralistic nature of each constituency, management and faculty, was developing. 
Varieties of Management and Faculty Perspectives 
Earlier we commented upon the considerable fragmentation on what we may refer 
to collectively as the management side, which included the Government; the 
Minister of Colleges and Universities; the various sections of the Ministry, inclu-
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ding the Staff Relations Secretariat; the Council of Regents; the Committee of 
Presidents of the CAATs; and the administrators of each of the twenty-two 
colleges. Apart from the highest levels of this hierarchy, the differences of 
perspective and position were greater within the various sub-categories of 
management than between them. In general, three principal positions may be 
discerned. 
First, there were those who enthusiastically supported the Government's 
strategy of edging the system toward a leaner, industrial production model 
preoccupied with efficiency. A trenchant example of this perspective is revealed in 
a letter which I received from a President shortly after the release of the IARC 
Report. Unlike some others who disputed the Report's claim that the colleges were 
being run along the lines of an industrial model, he acknowledged, at least "in a 
sense", the validity of that observation, but maintained that this was done 
"deliberately ... [in order] to achieve an atmosphere which combines facets of the 
world of business and industry in a teaching institution", i.e. the modelling of the 
hierarchical structure of industry was an intentional part of the learning 
environment. Another example was that of the administrators interviewed by the 
IARC who identified not as educators, but as taxpayers, arguing that the Province 
couldn't afford such an expensive college system. 
Second were those, mostly from middle management, who voiced concern 
about the Government's running down of the colleges and viewing them as skills 
factories rather than educational institutions, and who tended to sympathize with 
faculty concerns. It was apparent in some of our college visits that these 
individuals had lost credibility with senior management, and though admired by 
faculty, did not enjoy much confidence from faculty as they were seen to be 
ineffective in pressing faculty concerns. Such persons appeared to have taken a 
stand on principle that proved costly to them both in terms of career prospects and 
influence within the college. 
Between these two groups were those who quietly sympathized with faculty 
concerns, or were at least skeptical about Government policy, but who did little 
openly to challenge that policy or warn of its adverse effects on the colleges -
though some indicated that behind the scenes they lobbied for change. Recogniz-
ing the apparent futility of the efforts of the second group, the IARC empathized 
with the loyal dedication with which this group quietly tried to make the best of an 
increasingly bad situation. At the same time, we questioned the prudence of those 
in more senior positions who, while feeling that Government policy was having 
adverse effects, yet remained publicly silent about the matter. For one thing, their 
public silence contributed greatly to creating a rift at the college level between 
senior management and faculty; this was unlike the situation in the universities, 
where, even though the strident criticism of Government funding policy by senior 
institutional leaders was not successful in securing a change in funding policy, it 
did nevertheless help to maintain greater institutional cohesion than was the case 
for the colleges. Of perhaps even greater import was that as contrary information 
was increasingly filtered as it moved up through the bureaucracy, persons at the 
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top were deprived of the data which might have caused them to alter their 
positions. Thus, without any direct contact with faculty, persons at the top of the 
system could confidently dismiss voiced faculty concerns as mischievous, 
irresponsible, and unfounded. Our interviews indicated also that those highest in 
the structure had little idea of the strength of faculty discontent. They did not 
expect that the refusal of the Council of Regents to entertain proposals for change 
in workload arrangements in 1984 would provoke a strike, whereas many persons 
at lower levels, with more contact with faculty, considered this a very likely 
possibility. 
The differences of perspective among faculty were at least as great as those 
among management. I noted at least four principal perspectives among the many 
faculty and union leaders whom I interviewed. With the inevitable simplification 
which this sort of conceptual taxonomy involves, I offer the following categories: 
A. Unitary-Idealist 
This included persons with a strong professional identification who still 
maintained the unitary frame of reference which was characteristic of the early 
years of the colleges. They were uncomfortable with trade unionism and many 
viewed the colleges as a haven from the industrial strife of the business world. 
They remained proud of their association with the CAATs and felt that they could 
still fulfill at least some of the goals in the original vision even in reduced financial 
straits. 
B. Pluralist-Particularist 
This group is defined by its perception that there was a fundamental difference 
between their goals for the colleges and themselves and those of management, 
combined with a focus on local college matters of working conditions and/or the 
quality of education provided to their students. Many of this group had formerly 
identified with Perspective A, but had become burned out by adverse working 
conditions or cynical over what they perceived as the Government's betrayal of the 
original ideals upon which the system was established. In a more buoyant labour 
market, some of this group might have left the CAATs. While not ideologically 
committed to unionism, many could become enthusiastic union supporters if they 
saw the union as a useful tool in pursuing their ends. Others in this group were 
plain old-fashioned bread-and-butter unionists. 
C. Pluralist-Universalist 
This group brought universalist concerns about the social order to the college 
labour relations scene, viewing that arena as a battleground on which to wage a 
larger struggle against the Establishment which was then seen embodied in 
Ontario's Progressive Conservative Government. Their major concerns were not 
with changing the CAAT environment per se, but with the broad spillover and 
demonstration effects of reforms in the CAATs and with using the union-
management relationship in the CAATs as a springboard for launching more far 
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reaching change. While initially a rather small component of faculty, this group 
grew as more CAAT faculty began to perceive that the funding cutbacks in the 
CAATs were part of a larger attack on the whole education system and public 
sector, and alliances were formed between the CAAT faculty and other public 
sector workers. 
D. Pluralist-Unionist 
This group consisted of hard-core and professional unionists whose chief concern 
was the advancement of the interests of OPSEU. Some saw the CAATs mainly as a 
vehicle to be used in the power struggle between OPSEU and the Progressive 
Conservative Government. In this connection it was pertinent that the CAAT 
academic unit was one of the only sizable groups in the Public Service that had the 
right to strike. Others possibly were interested mainly in their own advancement 
within the union hierarchy. 
Although for expository convenience, I have associated these four perspectives 
with different groups, it is important to note that there were no readily identifiable 
blocs of faculty unequivocally identified with these different perspectives. Many 
faculty held more than one of these perspectives, and depending upon the cir-
cumstances could be motivated in a particular situation by one or another of 
these perspectives. The early 1980's was a period of flux in which the dominant 
perspective of faculty was subject to rapid and somewhat unpredictable change. I 
think that there was increasing momentum down the list of perspectives: the low 
trust dynamic initiated by management made the unitary-idealist perspective 
increasingly difficult to hold; the consciousness raising effects of interaction 
between CAAT faculty and their peers in other realms of the education system and 
public sector resulted in the particularism giving way to increased shades of 
universalism; and the increasing perception that only through the union could 
faculty hope to forestall their exploitation combined with a fear that the union itself 
was under attack by the Government led to greater identification with the union. 
The different perspectives could have been a source of fragmentation and 
dispersion of energy. That this was not the case was due to the genius or luck with 
which faculty opinion leaders seized upon the issue of workload and its mirror 
image, quality of education, as the rallying cry. I comment upon the significance 
of this issue in the next section, on faculty response. 
Faculty Response 
Before describing the content of the faculty response to the Government initiated 
moves which undermined the consensus upon which the CAATs were established, 
a methodological qualification is necessary. A strict application of Fox's trust 
dynamic model would involve tracing the myriad interactions of specific 
reciprocal statements and acts of the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of participants 
in the labour relations process in the CAAT system on an almost day to day basis. 
For example, a new interpretation of a specific collective agreement clause by one 
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Dean in one college and the local response of faculty to that interpretation could be 
a significant "move and countermove" in the Fox model. To approach the analysis 
in such situational and chronological detail would be enormously complex and 
tedious and require voluminous narrative. 
I have chosen instead to describe major general tendencies of each of the two 
aggregate parties (i.e. management and faculty) during major phases of the 
relationship. This heuristic simplification is useful in helping us to focus upon 
key tendencies, but it does oversimplify the complexity of the interactions. 
Specifically, it obscures the fact that some elements of what I have termed the 
faculty response may have occurred earlier than some elements of the initial 
management provocation, as the influence of faculty perspectives C and D would 
imply. Yet, on balance, I think that it is accurate to say that the galvanizing of 
sufficient faculty of perspective B, and the politicizing of sufficient numbers of 
those with perspective A, to attain such a massive strike vote as was achieved in 
1984 was largely a reaction to Government and management positions, not an 
autonomous happening - though faculty with persectives C and D were no doubt 
catalysts. 
Faculty consciousness of and resistance to the directions toward which the 
Government began pushing the system in the mid-Seventies gained momentum 
slowly from the late-Seventies into the early-Eighties. This resistance began with 
increased insistence on formal rights under the collective agreement and increased 
numbers of grievances. The number of arbitration awards under Article 4, 
Instructional Assignments, increased from an average of about two a year in the 
late-Seventies to eight in 1982, eleven in 1983, and fifteen in 1984 (IARC, 
Appendix III). Collective bargaining became more confrontational. The IARC 
reported that "following the 1975/76 contract, negotiations have been protracted, 
frustrating experiences and have involved extensive third party assistance ... the 
parties' ability to use the negotiations process to establish collective agreements 
over the past ten years is not enviable" (p. 19). A fact finder's report in 1984 
characterized the bargaining relationship as one of "conflict, intense competition, 
overt use of power, direct influence attempts, aggressive and antagonistic 
behaviour, a high level of distrust and denial of legitimacy" (quoted in IARC, p. 
21). While the preceding quotation does not single out either party, comments 
from those present at the negotiating table suggest that the more intemperate 
remarks were more likely to emanate from the union side, not surprising given that 
the talks were making little headway on the major items in dispute and this was the 
side that was most frustrated with the status quo. In addition, CAAT faculty were 
increasingly participating in coalitions with others from the educational system 
and public sector in an effort to influence Government policy through political 
means. 
Union strategy in bargaining increased concentration on workload, or instruc-
tional assignment, as it was somewhat euphemistically labelled in the collective 
agreement. Possibly this narrowing of focus was in part due to the Provincial 
Restraint Program which constrained salary bargaining, although the union also 
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mounted an (unsuccessful) challenge of the Restraint Program. More importantly, 
workload was likely a far more significant issue to most faculty in the 
early-Eighties than salary. That is to say, given that workload for most CAAT 
faculty was significantly greater than was the norm for community colleges in 
North America, and CAAT faculty were probably the highest paid community 
college teachers on this continent, on the margin, most would probably have 
preferred a reduction of several hours of teaching to a few more percentage points 
of salary increase. 
Workload was also inherently - both symbolically and tangibly - associated 
with the quality of education. Increased workload, in terms of increased student 
contact hours per teacher, had been the primary consequence of reduced funding, 
and the Government's alleged betrayal of the original vision of the colleges was 
seen to be intimately associated with money, workload, and making instructional 
assignments in a way that emphasized filling classrooms and timetables rather than 
the quality of education provided. The rhetoric with which union workload 
demands were clothed, in contrast, emphasized not the purely personal interests of 
teachers (except for equity), but that workload reduction was a necessary condition 
for improvement of the quality of education. The genius of the way in which the 
case for workload reform was presented was that it equated reduced workload 
with improved quality of education. Thus faculty of perspective B could agitate 
for workload reduction with no inhibitions about pursuing their own interests, 
and those of perspective A could identify with the lightness of the union position. 
This is not to say that there was anything untoward about linking workload with 
quality of education, for, by and large, the IARC concluded that there was at least 
a prima facie case that excessive workloads were impairing the quality of educa-
tion (see pp. 85-86). However, developing this connection and presenting it 
effectively was a masterstroke of collective bargaining strategy - notwithstanding 
the initial management response to it. 
Management Response to the Workload Demand 
Management's response can be summarized rather succinctly: (a) there was no 
"general" workload problem in the system, though the possibility of isolated cases 
was conceded; (b) there was no evidence of a deterioration of the quality of 
education; (c) the union's proposed solution to the alleged workload problem, "the 
formula", was unwieldy, impossible to implement, and excessively costly, i.e. the 
cure was worse than the disease could possibly be imagined to be; and hence, (d) 
the proposed workload formula was not an appropriate subject for discussion in 
negotiations. 
The 1984 Strike and its Aftermath 
The next move by faculty was an overwhelming vote in favour of a strike. The 
strike occurred in November, 1984, and it was a jarring experience for most 
concerned, particularly as it was the first strike in the CAAT system (not counting 
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the occasional and poorly supported one day walkouts over representation in the 
early years) and the first strike experience for most faculty and administrators. The 
colleges were concerned about permanent loss of students, seat purchases from 
the Federal Government, and credibility with industry, and the Minister was 
particularly concerned about the possible loss of the academic year for students. 
The faculty were legislated back to work, with all items outstanding - except the 
one that most felt had precipitated the strike - being referred to arbitration. Under 
Bill 130 (Ch. 43, S.O. 1984), the only issue that really mattered, workload, was 
referred to an ad hoc inquiry committee, the Instructional Assignment Review 
Committee. 
The union reaction to the establishment of the IARC was indicative of how far 
the spiralling low trust dynamic had proceeded. I have every reason to believe that 
even as late as 1983, and possibly early in 1984, the union would have welcomed 
the establishment of a committee of neutrals that was charged with "conducting] a 
comprehensive review of all aspects of instructional assignment in the colleges..." 
Yet, in April, 1985, when invited by the Committee to participate, the formal 
response of the provincial union was to boycott the proceedings and challenge the 
legitimacy and integrity of the process. The local response to the call for a boycott 
was uneven. Several local unions met with the Committee; a few sent personally 
abusive letters to the Committee, questioning our judgment or integrity in agreeing 
to serve; in a few colleges all randomly selected faculty declined to meet with us, 
but in all other colleges the vast majority of faculty who were invited to meet 
with us did so. A major concern expressed in almost every college was that we 
might be manipulated into concluding in favour of the Government position in the 
dispute, or that the Government would suppress or ignore our report if it did not 
support the Government position, i.e. that the process would not be fair. The union 
argued also that the establishment of the IARC was an inappropriate intrusion in 
the collective bargaining process. It maintained that in the first instance, the strike 
should have been allowed to run its course; and failing that, workload, like the 
other matters in dispute, should have been referred to arbitration. While I 
appreciate the principles that were invoked in these arguments, I believe, 
nevertheless, that the principal objection to the process was the concern that the 
union position would not be given fair treatment, a perception quintessentially 
associated with the low degree of trust which had come to characterize the 
relationship between the Government and the union2. 
As the IARC Report has been widely disseminated, I will make only a few 
observations from it here, observations that are pertinent to the next stages in the 
development of faculty-management relations in the CAATs. First, we concluded 
that there were indeed "general" workload problems in the system and these likely 
did, or would shortly, compromise quality of education. Second, though tending 
to vindicate the union's analysis of the problem, we found serious weaknesses in 
the solution that the union proposed, a system-wide workload formula, and 
recommended an alternative approach which emphasized local negotiation of 
actual teaching and other contact hours for each program, subject, or discipline. 
104 Michael L. Skolnik 
The IARC Report was enthusiastically welcomed by the union and, apparently, 
the vast majority of faculty - though our strong recommendations for localization 
of bargaining were politely dismissed and I have yet to see a comment on our actual 
recommendations for dealing with workload. In their eyes, we were transformed 
overnight, as it were, from villains to heroes. Representative of this reaction, but 
with the singular literary flourish of Centennial College union newsletter, is the 
following passage: 
What good will the Skolnik report produce? For many of us, its first benefit 
was an immediate and much-needed psychological boost. Before, during, and 
after last year's strike, when we protested the decline of quality education in 
our col leges , we sometimes felt like Columbus trying to convince a skeptical 
court that the world is round. "Give us a chance to prove it", we said. "Give us 
the ships and then see whether w e sail off the earth". Queen Isabella . . . didn't 
trust our words, despite our long experience in navigation, and instead 
referred our theory of the universe to the Spanish Inquisition (Skolnik's 
committee) for investigation. When Survival or Excellence? appeared, we 
were enormously pleased (and somewhat surprised) to see that the inquisitors 
had actually ruled in favour of the heretics for a change. [ U n f e t t e r e d , 
September, 1985: 7] 
The reaction of management was more mixed and less public. I have not seen any 
published commentaries on the report from management representives. I have, of 
course, received numerous informal comments and heard, second-hand, of others. 
These have ranged from a few supportive comments, of a more temperate nature 
than the passage quoted above, to many which questioned the adequacy of the 
Committee's understanding of the purpose, role, and history of the CAATs. If the 
comments from the management side which I heard were at all representative of 
that side's reaction, the IARC report failed to convince management, by and large, 
of the seriousness of the workload problem - though the report may have garnered 
management support for the position it advanced on some of the other issues which 
it addressed, e.g. funding or professional development. 
The Government 's Change of Heart on Workload 
If the IARC Report did not convince management of the seriousness of the 
workload problem, and certainly not of the desirability of a formula which the 
Committee recommended against, then the next step in the development of 
management-faculty relations was a most curious one indeed. That was manage-
ment's rather sudden agreement, in Fall, 1985, to negotiate a workload formula of 
the type proposed by the union, and the same type which management had argued 
for over ten years would be extremely detrimental to the college system. 
Several factors no doubt contributed to management's change of heart. One was 
the IARC Report, which even if unconvincing to management, created a public 
credibility gap for it. Another factor was the change in Government which had 
taken place in May, 1985. The new Liberal Government had, while in opposition, 
criticized the Progressive Conservative Government for its handling of the CAATs 
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in general, and management-union relations in particular, and was anxious to 
establish more harmonious relations with the union. In addition, the Liberal Minor-
ity Government was dependent upon the support of the New Democratic Party, 
and the NDP had assured the union of its support in reaching "a fair settlement" of 
the workload issue. And yet, against these forces, the Committee of Presidents 
was still urging the management negotiating committee to avoid a major revision 
of the workload article (Amernic, 1988: 19-23). 
Amernic, having interviewed many of those involved directly in the negotia-
tions, reports that the management team felt that it had no choice but to agree to 
some type of formula and sell it as best it could to the Presidents. He suggests that 
the mangement team opted for a strategy of surprising the union with its own 
sudden proposal for a formula and an attempt to focus the negotiations on the cost 
implications of various numerical parameters of the formula, hoping in this way to 
limit the financial damage that would result from the formula. He suggests further 
that if the union were to refuse to consider costing information it would dissipate 
some of the goodwill that it then enjoyed at the Ministry, with the public, and with 
rank and file faculty who "were concerned about the survival of the CAAT system" 
(pp. 40-41). The image is of an aggressive management strategy, with the 
management team accepting that it was cornered and trying to gain whatever 
advantage that it could in the circumstances. 
Amernic's case is argued persuasively and supported by quotations from 
bargaining team members. Still, I have problems with this interpretation of such a 
major reversal of policy. For one thing, the IARC offered management a viable 
alternative on a silver platter. As the union "kept trumpeting the IARC report" (p. 
20), the management team could have solved whatever credibility problem it had 
by offering to accept the IARC recommendations on workload. This would have 
demonstrated a willingness to change the fabric of workload provisions signifi-
cantly, and the union would have had a hard time discrediting the IARC 
recommendations. Further, once the initial element of surprise wore off, the 
management team would be right square where it had resisted being for at least ten 
years, in the middle of detailed discussions of the numerical parameters of the type 
of workload formula advocated by the union. Moreover, while cost was obviously 
a concern, management's principal objection to the formula had always been that it 
was unwieldy and would undermine the system's flexibility. 
Thus, I am inclined to regard the statements of the management team about the 
cleverness of its blitzkrieg strategy as somewhat of a rationalization intended to 
elicit the confidence of the more hardnosed of the management cadre. Looking at 
these developments within Fox's model, I would offer a different explanation of 
management's change of heart. I think that the management team was tired of the 
strife and feared that continued confrontation would destroy the system. With a 
new Government in place that promised to revitalize the system, the time was ripe 
for management to try to reverse the spiralling low trust dynamic which could 
result only in disaster. Still feeling that the formula was a bad idea, but recognizing 
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that the union could not give up its attachment to it, I see management's acceptance 
of the formula as a high trust initiative in which it attempted to change the dynamic 
of management-faculty relations in the CAATs. 
Management's acceptance of the formula was accompanied by more than $60 
million being added to the system and several hundred new faculty appointments. 
Workload for most faculty was reduced, for some from 18-20 hours a week to 
as low as 14. In addition, the Government appointed a Special Adviser on 
Governance who, by and large, supported and further developed the IARC 
recommendations in this area. In January, 1987, the Minister announced the 
introduction of changes in governance, including the requirement of college 
councils and limited representation of faculty on Boards of Governors. None of 
these moves, and related ones in professional development, gave the faculty all 
that they wanted, but, given how frozen the system had been in these respects for 
over a decade, they might be regarded as not insignificant steps toward 
establishing a new era in management-faculty relations. At any rate, management 
felt that it had moved since Fall, 1984, and now it was up to the union and to faculty 
to respond. 
The New Era of Continuous Challenge 
If management expected that its concessions would earn it goodwill with the union 
and lead to some sort of mutual accommodation, its anticipation proved to be 
sorely incorrect. Even though it involved significant workload reductions for the 
majority of faculty, the early experience with the workload formula which was 
implemented in 1986 has been characterized by a plethora of faculty complaints 
over the interpretation and application of the formula. My interviews with 
administrators in several colleges, including management members of the joint 
union-management workload monitoring committees, indicates a perception 
among management that many of these complaints are mere attempts to 
manipulate the formula to the advantage of the faculty member rather than to 
redress demonstrably inequitable or excessive workloads. I hasten to add that these 
are management perceptions which I am reporting here, not the conclusions of 
impartial studies, for which the necessary data would be impossible to obtain. 
Examples which managers have given me of complaints which they view as 
bordering on petty include the following: attempts by faculty to get the essay 
evaluation factor, which is the highest evaluation factor in formula, for short 
answer quizes, of even just a few words; requests for special workload credit for 
activities which might be considered normal responsibilities of teachers, e.g. 
consulting with a substitute teacher about a class held while a faculty member was 
away sick, or for time spent photocopying assignment instructions (which one 
might think would be covered by the preparation allowance in the formula); and 
seeking credit for a larger course enrolment than one has because other teachers 
have a larger course enrolment for which they get credit in the formula. It may well 
be that there is more in these complaints than meets the eye, or that they have been 
provoked by management attempts to manipulate the formula in other respects, 
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as I have seen claimed in some local union newsletters. Nevertheless, the existence 
of such complaints suggests the opposite of the type of give-and-take atmosphere 
which characterizes a high trust relationship; that the acceptance by management 
of the formula has not resulted in a weakening of the low trust dynamic under 
which the colleges have suffered for many years. 
Another perception about the workload determination process which has been 
related to me by numerous managers pertains to the College Workload Monitoring 
Committees which attempt to resolve workload complaints. The perception is that 
the union representatives typically vote as a bloc, indiscriminately in favour of the 
faculty side in a dispute. Deadlocks are resolved only when one or more members 
of the management side decide in favour of the complainant in order to avoid 
conflict or to be seen making a conciliatory gesture to the union. Management thus 
perceives that its hope for a new era of joint problem solving has not been realized, 
and that the concessions which it made in the workload determination process have 
been abused. 
The aggressiveness with which the union has challenged management interpre-
tation and application of the new workload article has been matched by equally 
aggressive attempts to make further gains in this area in the next round of bargain-
ing. The principal focus of union demands in the bargaining which commenced in 
1987 was workload. This has been demoralizing to a management which felt that it 
had made unprecedented concessions in that area in 1986 and that it would be 
prudent to have at least a few years' experience with the new workload system, and 
time to analyze that experience, before making significant changes to it. As well, 
having just gotten an additional $60 million put into the colleges' base operating 
budgets, management sees little likelihood of obtaining additional funds to reduce 
workload further. To management, the negotiation of the workload article is the 
most time-demanding, tedious, and draining area, and it dreads the prospect of 
having to become mired year after year in such negotiations.3 
A third area of union militancy is that of faculty participation. The colleges 
began in 1987 to establish academic councils of the types recommended by both 
the IARC and the Pitman Reports. In most colleges, however, the establishment of 
councils has been marked by disputes about its composition, constitution, or scope 
of authority. In some cases, the major issue has been whether the teachers who sit 
on the council would be representatives of the union or of faculty. Management 
has maintained that it is the professional role and expertise of faculty, not their 
union affiliation, which warrants them participation on academic councils -
though why this did not warrant such participation prior to the Minister's edict in 
January, 1987 is not clear. Management acknowledges that faculty have legitimate 
employment interests, but argues that the collective bargaining process provides 
an adequate vehicle for the representation of those interests. 
Those who favour the union representation model argue, on the other hand, that 
the legitimate concerns of the union go beyond bread and butter issues, one of the 
most vital of other concerns being quality of education. Taking a pluralistic view, 
they tend to see management as just another interest group with no more stake in, 
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or claim to speak for, quality of education than the union. As some feel that 
management has allowed the quality of education to deteriorate, they would see 
union involvement in quality of education issues as a healthy thing. Needless to 
say, statements like the previous one are tantamount to waving a red flag in front of 
many managers. Nor are faculty themselves united on this issue. A local union 
newsletter in one college noted that in a meeting with Mr. Pitman, some faculty 
maintained that the only valid representation must come from the union, while 
"others insisted that the union had an agenda of its own, and did not necessarily 
always represent the best interests of the majority of the faculty" (Humber Faculty 
Newsletter, April 1986: 2). Yet another contentious issue with respect to the 
councils has been that of workload credit for participation, with one side 
maintaining that professionals should not ask for time off for such purposes, the 
other arguing that to expect faculty to take on this role without extra credit borders 
on exploitation or implies a wish to undermine faculty participation. 
The responses of the union, and many faculty, to management initiatives with 
respect to faculty participation imply that the respondents view the form of these 
initiatives as indicating low trust. Whether this is the case is often difficult to 
judge. One management initiative, however, which seems very clearly to convey a 
low trust message to faculty is the recent announcement that the membership of 
Boards of Governors will be "opened up and strengthened" to include one faculty 
member (and one student, one administrative staff member, and support staff 
member), but that the faculty member (and other internal members) will not have 
voting rights pending a review of potential conflict of interest questions over the 
next two years (Ontario, 1987). As college faculty are represented, with voting 
rights, in nearly all other provinces which have independent governing boards, it is 
difficult to see the rationale for such caution in Ontario, except out of fear that 
faculty will abuse this privilege - a quintessentially low trust view. 
Taken together, the various actions and statements of the union since 1984 
would seem to suggest that the relationship has now entered the phase which Fox 
describes as the Continuous Challenge Pattern: 
Here we find the workgroup refusing to legitimize management's claim to 
assert and pursue objectives which are seen as overriding certain interests, 
practices, or values of the group. The group may, of course, be forced to 
submit but it continues to withhold legitimacy; fighting guerilla skirmishes 
wherever possible, seeking always to undermine management's position and 
aspiring to mobilize enough power for an effective challenge... A manage-
ment working to the doctrine of mutual accommodation will expect that an 
concessions it offers to be met halfway, but instead it finds that concessions 
merely prompt the group to raise the stakes of the contest by enlarging its 
claims, (pp. 310 -312 ) . 
Conclusions and Prognoses 
This essay began by suggesting that the suspicion and distrust which characterize 
the relationship between faculty and management in the CAATs constitute the 
most serious barrier to academic development and excellence in the colleges. We 
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then traced the development of management-faculty relations from the early years 
of inspired social consensus, through the period in which the Government 
appeared to have provoked the dissolution of that consensus, to the present state of 
continuous challenge. 
Fox observes that the repudiation of the legitimacy of management which 
defines the continuous challenge model can stem from either of two sharply 
contrasting orientations, universalist or particularist. Under the former, the 
challenge to management is part of a social philosophy which rejects the existing 
economic and social order and "inspires action on behalf of all employees as 
victims of oppressive hierarchical power". Under the latter, the challenge to 
management derives from the specific workplace concerns of the group in question 
and its doubt that management, at its most fundamental level, is committed to the 
best interests of the group. He notes further that these two orientations are most 
difficult to distinguish in practice. Particularist ends are often pursued under the 
rhetorical cloak of "universalist appeals for justice and equality"; universalist ends 
may be legitimized and sold to rank and file through seizing upon particularist 
grievances. In CAAT labour relations, there are indications of both particularist 
and universalist sentiments and strategies, and it is difficult to determine which is 
dominant. 
Insofar as the continuous challenge pattern in the CAATs reflects an increas-
ingly universalist orientation on the part of faculty, and acceptance of the inevi-
tability of irreconcilable class war, there would seem to be little hope for a sus-
tained improvement in this relationship, only temporary "periods of armed truce 
as each side licks its wounds and watches the enemy for signs of a weak spot in 
its defences" (Fox, p. 311). Improvements in those colleges where the universalist 
orientation of faculty is weak would be possible were the present provincial 
bargaining structure to be replaced with local bargaining, as recommended by 
both the IARC and Pitman - but given the power and preferences of the central 
bargaining agents, this reform seems unlikely. 
Following Fox, I submit that the validity of the universalist characterization of 
management-faculty relations, with its stirring class war rhetoric, is not a matter of 
objective fact, but a function of perception, specifically whether it describes the 
dominant perception on either side of the relationship. If alternatively, the 
dominant perceptions are those of a particularist orientation, then some type of 
pragmatic compromises which could reverse the present low trust dynamic, and 
ultimately lead to a win-win option, are possible, at least in principle. However, 
given the acrimonious history of this relationship, the diversity and fragmentation 
of points of contact, and the paucity of human relations training on both sides, the 
search for compromise will be difficult and risky. 
Given its greater control over the agenda, the primary initiatives for change 
must come from management; and if the quality of the relationship is to change, 
these initiatives must be of a high trust nature, i.e. making itself vulnerable in ways 
where the potential for harm if the trust is abused exceed the gains that will result if 
the trust is not abused, such as giving faculty a vote on governing boards, or 
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meaningful say in academic decisions. Management may feel that the risks 
involved in such actions are too great, especially if its diagnosis of the relationship 
leads it to perceive that the universalist orientation is dominant among faculty. If 
so, that will be the end of the search for a higher trust alternative to continuous 
challenge. 
Should management decide to take the risk - and not just pretend to do so, which 
would make the present bad situation even worse - the onus will be on faculty to 
decide how they wish to respond. Should they wish to cling to a universalist 
orientation, feeling that any accommodation would betray their ideology, they no 
doubt will reject management overtures, alleging them to be insincere. If, on the 
other hand, faculty should choose to seek pragmatic resolution of their particularist 
grievances, they will have to be willing to make some high trust responses, i.e. 
make themselves vulnerable also, to do so. Ultimately, in spite of, or more likely 
because of, its sheer simplicity, Fox's concept of trust would seem to offer a most 
insightful perspective on management-faculty relations in the CAATs. It is a 
concept, the pursuit of which is laden with risk, but also with potential for great 
benefit for all who have a stake in the Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology. 
N O T E S 
1 While this estimate was dismissed by the Minister of Colleges and Universities in August, 1985 as "a 
little bit faci le", in May 1986, he announced that the Government was injecting an additional $60 
million into the C A A T s "to improve the quality of education" (The Globe and Mail , August 3, 1985: 
15; Ontario Hansard, May 29, 1986: 1006). 
2 When asked to rule on the workload issue, the arbitrator held that he had no jurisdiction over it, unlike 
the other outstanding items in dispute, and that there was nothing unlawful about this restriction of his 
jurisdiction. As for my own involvement in the process, when I first accepted the Chairmanship of 
the IARC, in January, 1985,1 was not aware of any questions about its legitimacy. By the time that I 
developed an appreciation of the union 's concerns about its legitimacy, as these were pointed out to 
me in M a y , I was well into the study, and felt that a resignation would have contributed more to 
perpetuating the problem than to its solution. As I considered myself to be as impartial and competent 
for this task as anyone who might replace me, and that the Committee had been duly established by 
the Legislative Assembly of Ontario and would go ahead in any event, I felt responsible to complete 
the job that I had started whatever reservations I developed along the way. 
3 The most contentious issue in the 1987-88 negotiations, which were completed subsequent to the 
preparation of this manuscript, was the union 's demand to equalize maximum teaching hours for all 
teachers. Management regarded this as an irksome and costly demand unrelated to any real problem 
of equity or quality. In view of the substantial variation in teaching situations, Gandz termed this 
demand, 'untenable ' . The IARC also had concluded that substantial variation in maximum teaching 
hours was warranted. Apparently faculty were divided, as the negotiating team's call for a strike 
mandate was voted down by a small majority. Faculty with whom I spoke suggested that in concrete 
(particularist) terms, the issue was not of sufficient magnitude to warrant a strike; but that a vote in 
favour of strike could have been a way of voicing lack of confidence and trust in management (i.e. 
universalist concerns). The stalemate in negotiations was broken when the issue was referred to a 
joint study committee with recourse to arbitration. 
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